TR 
EN
Predicting future events has become extremely challenging. There is a lot of information and intellectual games which are difficult to solve are in full swing around the region and the world. In this context, the Russian-Ukrainian war turned into a different tactical and strategic intelligence laboratory with unexpected results. I have already mentioned in my previous assessment regarding the war that Russia is straining to deal with two issues. First, Western support for Ukraine. The second is its army, which appears to be unprepared in some aspects. I stated my conviction that solving either of these problems in a short period of time would be difficult, and that there was clearly a discrepancy between its political objectives and the quality of its conventional military power.
Russians face difficulty to organize and produce outcomes on the ground in terms of operational tempo, intelligence, personnel, and logistics despite the massive damage in Ukraine by Russia.
I would like to clarify the intelligence aspect of the problem a little more in this article.
Earlier this year, some Western think tanks concluded that Russian intelligence was more successful on the ground than the Russian military. I don't agree with the idea that intelligence as a whole is more successful than another. Russian services are skilled at gathering information and creating information networks, it would not be wrong to claim. However, the most important element that completes the intelligence production process here is the assessment process. In this aspect, it is now becoming evident that they have some issues.
It is inevitable that the direction of intelligence, information assessment, and information transfer systems will experience disruptions in the direction of intelligence which often originate from the closed tradition of the Eastern Bloc. Because the wrong and even unquestionable kind of decisions taken by the decision-makers at the beginning; It can cause many errors in the intelligence production system. They are also present in Western countries. The wrong questions that intelligence requests in this context will create; it can partly create hesitations in news gathering activities and particularly in assessments. They might also occur in Western countries. The wrong questions that intelligence requests in this context will create; can partly create hesitations in information-gathering activities and particularly in assessments. In this regard, when a jam occurs or is experienced, problems in acute dimension such as showing or hiding the truth differently than it appears may arise.
As a matter of fact, the unconfirmed information to the effect that the Russian foreign intelligence organization attempted to stop this before the war by warning the Russian leadership that more time was needed for preparation and that the operation should be postponed and that received no response were also reflected in open sources.
Since the beginning of the war, the Russians have been successful on tactical intelligence on the theatre. Examples from open sources show how the Russians have achieved notable success in electronic warfare, espionage, and the development of news networks.
But all these tactical successes do not compensate for the administration's misjudgments or errors in strategic intelligence assessments that help to form political decisions beforehand. As a result, as seen in the instance of Wagner, there are many implications that can lead to a loss of prestige.
You're establishing a spy network on the ground, but you have no control over the man who runs is the head of the private military business that you believe he is supporting you. This contradiction is the consequence of the pressures and reservations that direction constraits and faultful requests impose on every stage of intelligence production.
Furthermore, potential steps that those who observe these pressures and reservations within the country may make in order to reverse this may generate different challenges for the Russian leadership. So, what could happen next?
After so many brawls, they may seek to conduct the war for a reasonable period of time in a controlled and slow pace in order to regain internal order. Because they need time. However, the opposite party will not want to give this opportunity. Indeed, the West's aggressive miscellaneous intelligence assaults have begun to accelerate. The drone assaults on the Russian intelligence ship Ivan Khurs in May, 43 miles off the Istanbul Strait; in this sense it can be considered as a significant indicator that the West will not let the Russians breathe. Although nothing is said to have happened to the ship, more violent attacks on the intelligence production structure can be expected. Psychological superiority seems to be on the opposite side after the Wagner event.
As a result, there is no intelligence without a plan or it is not attempted to carry out information production activity and related intelligence operations rushing the plan with different motives. In such circumstances, there is a greater chance of becoming vulnerable to ooze and misdirection. All of this, of course, is applicable to all countries. Opponents have serious inadequacies in this context as well. Although it seems difficult for the Russians to reverse this situation for now, their potential to create surprises on the theatre it should not be ignored depending on their continuity in their political stance.
References:
Kırıkkanat, Alp, ‘‘Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı 2023 Tahminleri’’, Milliyet Newspaper, January 10, 2023, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/dusunenlerin-dusuncesi/rusya-ukrayna-savasi-2023-tahminleri-6885328 (Last Access Date: June 27, 2023)
Gardner, Frank, ‘‘İngiliz düşünce kuruluşu: Rus ajanlar, Ukrayna'da Rus ordusundan daha başarılı’’, BBC News Türkçe, March 29, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/ceq55y22pp8o (Last Access Date: June 27, 2023)
