TR 
EN
The Widening Front of the War and the New Command-and-Control Problem…
Attacks on commercial vessels that are waiting at some Black Sea ports or underway at sea have recently begun to increase. First, I pray for God’s mercy upon the 37 Turkish and foreign seafarers who lost their lives aboard merchant ships attacked at sea, and I remember them with respect.
A compilation of the commercial vessels attacked at sea between 24 February 2022 and 26 August 2026, as the Russia–Ukraine war spilled into the Black Sea, was published as a report on the website of the Turkish Shipowners’ Association. The report is based on information drawn from open sources rather than being a statistically definitive data source.
According to the report, a total of 146 commercial vessels were attacked in various ways between those dates. The total number of Turkish-owned or Turkish-controlled vessels hit (including Turkish-flagged ones) is 34, while the number of Turkish-flagged vessels hit is stated as 5. Overall, there is a significant increase in the number of attacks, particularly in 2026: approximately 82 vessels have been attacked in various ways. There are of course other reports and sources, and the figures can change daily. This situation affects all the littoral states politically and economically, first and foremost our own country. In this article, however, we will look at the security dimension of the matter.
The attacks in the Black Sea appear to be expanding geographically. Their spread now forms a profile running from the Kerch Strait to the waters off the western Black Sea coastal strip, reaching as far as 14–15 nautical miles from the entrance of the Istanbul Strait and 50 nautical miles off Sinop.
The emerging situation marks a shift to a dimension quite different from the risks posed by threats at Ukrainian or Russian ports or in their approaches. At first we were talking about moored mines that had been laid off the Ukrainian coast and had broken loose from their tethers; now we are discussing attacks carried out with armed UAVs, USVs, drones and missiles.
Taking the Shipowners’ Association’s report into account, a significant share of the vessels hit by Russia appear to be ships carrying grain, corn, sunflower oil and similar cargoes to Ukrainian ports. Ukraine, for its part, appears to be targeting mostly Russian tankers described as the “shadow fleet.”
We are living through a new situation in which classical navigational safety practices, and the ship and port security measures implemented under the ISPS Code, have proved inadequate.
On another front, reports have begun to appear that the London marine insurance market has expanded the area of the Black Sea it considers high-risk because of the growing attacks on commercial vessels.
Recruitment difficulties are growing on both sides, and the parties are therefore attempting to bring in troops from other countries. Yet the war goes on. According to the Shipowners’ Association’s report, unofficially, of the 146 vessels attacked, 47 (32%) were attacked by Ukraine and 93 (64%) by Russia. Five vessels are reported to have been damaged by striking mines, and one vessel was hit by an unknown party. I will address Russia’s position on this matter in a separate article.
However, although the number and share of Ukraine’s attacks appear lower than Russia’s, Ukraine in particular needs close attention. This is because the recent attacks have taken place very close to Türkiye’s territorial waters, raising questions as to whether some incidents may involve an element of intent. Ukraine-originated attacks appear to have played a role in the geographical expansion of the attacks.
Let us examine this a little.
For example, in March 2026, a Sierra Leone-flagged tanker managed by a Turkish company was hit while underway 15 nautical miles off the Istanbul Strait. The vessel had departed Novorossiysk loaded with oil and was hit as it approached the vicinity of our territorial waters. The ship is alleged to be a unit linked to Russia’s “Shadow Fleet.” Even so, the fact that this ship was hit right under our nose is, of course, telling.
Another example: in August, a vessel of ours carrying vegetables was the target of 3 drones off Tuapse. A fire broke out on board in the attack and 5 of our seamen were wounded. Let us suppose this attack was intended to obstruct trade with Russia. But what are we to say about our other vessel that went to help and was likewise subjected to a drone attack in international waters? Ukraine’s ambassador to Ankara was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be asked for information and an explanation regarding these attacks in the Black Sea.
It is known that, since 2022, Ukraine has been attacking commercial vessels in the Black Sea with surface and aerial drones. Not stopping there, on 6 July 2026 it launched a new, special, drone-centric operation called “Operation MoLoChKa” (МОсква Ляже Через Крим – Moscow will fall through Crimea). Ukraine is reported to be aiming, with this operation, to increase pressure on Russian maritime transport in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Whether this operation, like previous ones, will create new risks for commercial maritime traffic in the Black Sea will become clearer in the coming period.
Why would Ukraine risk restricting its own freedom of action by setting Türkiye against itself through these attacks?
I will try to interpret this issue through a security approach, setting aside the dimension of international law of the sea.
It does not seem possible for Zelensky (referred to in open sources as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief) to reach an agreement by ceding the occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia. More than half of the public does not want a withdrawal from Donbas. This inevitably indicates an effort to sustain the current situation by accepting the need to muster more foreign aid, more money and more troops. This desperation leads to pursuits that go beyond realism in political objectives. In this process, the influence of certain Western countries on Ukraine’s political and military decision-making also needs to be assessed separately.
The first major difficulty seen in the Ukrainian army came in 2024, with the strategic disagreements and the mobilization debates between Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi and the political leadership. Zelensky dismissed him. However, this man became Ukraine’s ambassador to London.
His successor, General Syrskyi, had been trained in the Soviet system and was regarded by some circles as a rigid commander. In response to reactions within the army and among the public, Zelensky dismissed him as well and appointed General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief.
Within Ukraine’s defense structure, a marked divergence of views appears to have emerged between the traditional understanding of command and a technology- and reform-oriented approach. Behind the reformists stood Fedorov, the former Minister of Defense, who made statements such as “…the military structure was slow to adopt technology and obstructed procurement reforms…”
The attacks on commercial vessels began before Drapatyi became Commander-in-Chief. Yet they show no tendency to stop afterwards either. It would of course be wrong to attribute these attacks solely to the previous commanders or to Drapatyi. For instance, Drapatyi has other problems at the moment. In the process of building his new command structure, the political authority appears to retain a decisive role, and he is trying to carry out this work with the cadres appointed by Zelensky. This produces the profile of a commander who carries high responsibility, yet in whose command structure the political authority’s influence continues.
Are we facing a structure in which the Office of the Commander-in-Chief cannot secure full control in terms of personnel and operational authority, creating a weakness in command-and-control processes? Or is a conceptual change being deliberately pursued through the increasing number of attacks on commercial vessels?
The fact that Ukraine’s last three changes of Commander-in-Chief have been politically troubled, together with the differing approaches seen in the selection of targets and methods, raises the possibility that a weakness may have developed in command-and-control processes.
The question, then, is this: who is giving the order for Ukrainian drones to attack commercial vessels navigating outside, or in the vicinity of, the war risk zone in the Black Sea?
Zelensky appears to be trying to retain control of the army through key personnel appointments, using his wartime powers. However, Ukraine’s attacks on our commercial vessels may be a reflection of the disagreements within the army between the traditional understanding of command and the reform- and technology-oriented approach. On the other hand, this situation may also stem from the reformists not having fully established the new command-and-control systems.
All these factors indicate that the current situation creates a security environment highly open to manipulation.
For example, it was alleged that, following a drone attack on one of our vessels, the Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces sent an official message by e-mail to the family of a seafarer of ours who lost his life. The message was alleged to contain the statement: “Your brother chose this path knowingly. What they did contributed to the enrichment of the Russian Federation, and he got what he deserved.” This message, which conforms to no standard of officialdom or seriousness, was denied by Ukraine. The ambassador did offer his condolences, to be sure, but why the attack was carried out has not been explained.
Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, the man who heads the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Command and is alleged to have sent the message (which was subsequently denied), is also an interesting personality. His transition from business to his current position, once the war began, was very rapid. Brovdi is described as an unconventional figure and an active social media user who rose to senior posts at a time when the Ukrainian army was trying to rid itself of entrenched, cumbersome habits inherited from the Soviet era. Brovdi openly says that he has adapted the methods he used in the business world to war. If Commander-in-Chief Drapatyi is part of a pro-modernization, new-generation understanding of command, Brovdi can be seen as one of the most radical representatives of this transformation in the field of unmanned systems. The figures who belong to the reformist wing or represent this approach are seen to be helping to close the gaps in the Ukrainian army’s use of core technological assets.
However, as field initiative grows in connection with the reforms, the importance of target designation and command-and-control mechanisms may increase to the same degree. Fast decisions can sometimes make a situation prone to error.
In this context, it becomes important to know, within Ukraine’s unmanned systems doctrine, by whom, on the basis of what intelligence, and within the framework of which rules of engagement maritime targets away from the front are designated as legitimate targets, and which command-and-control mechanism oversees this.
Finding answers to these questions from open sources is of course difficult. Yet attacks on the commercial vessels of a neutral country, in our exclusive economic zone very close to our territorial waters or in international waters, give rise to these questions.
In the context of shaping the war risk zone and the post-war security architecture, it must also be asked whether developments in the Black Sea are being steered by certain actors for strategic purposes. In particular, is a process being run that would lead the littoral states toward mutually divergent political positions within the security order likely to be established after the war?
The contradictions in the chain of command among Ukrainian military authorities, and the new drone-warfare doctrine that Brovdi represents, may be creating a new command-and-control problem in the exercise of strike authority. As the war drags on, the political ebbs and flows on both sides may be making it harder to define military and physical targets soundly. For Türkiye, this uncertainty creates a risk area that is not only about maritime security but also strategic and diplomatic. It may also create an environment open to manipulation from within or from outside.
We are going through a delicate phase in the Black Sea. For this reason, Türkiye needs to step up its diplomatic initiatives, encourage all parties to act with prudence, and intensify its efforts to protect the security of maritime trade.
Sources:
“Karadeniz’de Rusya ve Ukrayna Tarafından Vurulan/Hasar Verilen Ticari Gemiler Raporu (2022 – 2026),” Turkish Shipowners’ Association, 26 August 2026, https://armatorlerbirligi.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/TAB_Karadeniz_Ticari_Gemi_Saldirilari_Raporu_2022-2026.pdf (Last accessed: 22 September 2026)
“Karadeniz’de risk büyüdü, sigorta primi rekorda,” Dünya Gazetesi, 21 September 2026, https://www.dunya.com/sektorler/lojistik/karadenizde-risk-buyudu-sigorta-primi-rekorda-haberi-840740 (Last accessed: 22 September 2026)
“Ukrayna, bir ay içinde 218 Rus gemisini hedef aldı!,” QHA, 8 August 2026, https://www.qha.com.tr/ukrayna/ukrayna-bir-ay-icinde-218-rus-gemisini-hedef-aldi-530765 (Last accessed: 3 October 2026)
“Karadeniz’de ‘Lider Bordo Mavi’ gemisi vuruldu: 5 denizci yaralı,” Deniz Haber, 27 August 2026, https://www.denizhaber.net/karadenizde-lider-bordo-mavi-gemisi-vuruldu-5-denizci-yarali-haber-125935.htm (Last accessed: 3 October 2026)
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Mukhina, Olena, “Ukraine’s top general wants to end Soviet rules in army. But president’s wartime headquarters may still hold biggest one, commander says,” Euromaidan Press, 3 October 2026, https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/10/03/ukraines-top-general-wants-to-end-soviet-rules-in-army-but-presidents-wartime-headquarters-may-still-hold-biggest-one-commander-says/ (Last accessed: 3 October 2026)
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